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INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2005 the Washington Post reported that the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) planned to use a database on 16-18 year 
old high school and college students as an aid in military recruitment. 
The database contains birth dates, Social Security numbers, ethnicity, 
grade-point averages, and the students' curricula and e-mail addresses. 1 
Using state-of-the art "reinvented" public administration, which 
emphasizes steering rather rowing,2 the DOD outsourced creation of the 
database to a private firm, BeNow, Inc. After all, the DOD's mission 
and expertise do not lie in constructing such databases. Presumably 
firms that specialize in database development can do so more cost-
effectively than government agencies whose work focuses on other 
matters. However, privacy advocates suggested that the DOD's primary 
motive in contracting out was not to save the taxpayers money but 
rather "to circumvent laws that restrict the government's right to collect 
or hold citizen information by turning to private firms to do the work."3 
Technically, these advocates are probably wrong. The Privacy Act of 
1974,4 which directly regulates the DOD, should be applicable 
indirectly to its contractors through the Federal Acquisition Regulation.5 
Nevertheless, these critics of the DOD's outsourcing are on to 
something fundamental: when government . work is outsourced, the 
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1. Jonathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database: Recruiting Tool For Military 
Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at AOl. 
2. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); Al Gore, 
Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less 7 (U.S Government Printing 
Office, 1993). 
3. Krim, supra note 1, at AO 1. 
4. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 2177, 2194. 
5. Federal Acquisition Regulation, http://www.amet.gov/far (section 24.102(c)); see 
infra note 72. 
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administrative law values and constraints that apply to government are 
apt to be lost. 
As developed since the mid-1940s, administrative law includes 
regulations for transparency, checks on administrative abuse and 
intrusiveness, fair adjudication, stakeholder representation, and public 
participation in administrative decision-making.6 Broadly construed, 
administrative law also extends to the constitutional law that regulates 
agencies' interaction with clients, customers, their own employees, 
persons confined to prisons and public mental health facilities, 
contractors, and individuals encountered in street-level administration.7 
High profile examples of circumvention or obviation of federal 
administrative law through outsourcing include United Space Alliance's 
launch work on the space shuttle Columbia, which substantially reduced 
the media's ability to use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)8 to 
gain information on the decision-making and risk analyses associated 
with the tragic loss of the crew and shuttle. 9 Contracted for the DOD by 
the Department of the Interior's National Business Center to interrogate 
Iraqi prisoners, CACI, a private company, was deeply involved in the 
shocking abuse of human rights at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq .10 The 
ensuing damage to the U.S.'s self-image, national reputation, and 
international standing cannot be mitigated by the fact that CACI is non-
governmental and neither U.S. administrative law nor, apparently, 
constitutional law applied to its actions. 
In the process of reinventing its public administration the U.S. is 
"de-inventing" administrative law. More importantly, perhaps, it is 
doing so by default, that is, without serious and substantial public 
discussion and political debate on whether cost-effectiveness and other 
values associated with reinvented public administration should trump 
the norms embodied in administrative law. The readiness to accept the 
reinventers' vision of "a government that works better and costs less" is 
all the more striking in view of the nation's epic post-World War II 
6. P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF, R. SCHOTLAN, & C. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (9th ed. 1995); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR 
PUBLIC MANAGERS (2003). 
7. DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM & R. O ' LEARY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW (1997); 
David H. Rosenbloom, Retrofitting the Administrative State to the Constitution: Congress 
and the Judiciary's Twentieth-Century Progress, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 39, 39-46 (2000). 
8. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
9. A full record of pertinent information was obtained only through extraordinary 
means. See Columbia Accident Investigation Board-Final Report, 
http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/volumel/default.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
10. David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution and 
Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 109 (2005). 
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struggle to "tame" the federal bureaucracy. 11 
I. DEMOCRATIZING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES 
Whether bureaucracy and democracy can ever be fully compatible 
is a moot question. 12 Yet is it incontestable that, whatever their 
imperfections, federal administrative law, including constitutional 
doctrine, has gone a long way toward forcing democratic and 
constitutional values into public administrative practice. The 1946 
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)13 was intended to be "a bill 
of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are 
controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal 
Government."14 As amended, it has fulfilled much of that promise, 
though undoubtedly at the cost of encumbering administrative 
flexibility and efficiency. 15 Much constitutional law since the 1950s has 
had a similar impact by putting public bureaucracy in the "harness of 
procedural due process"16 and other constitutional rights.17 These 
developments have been discussed at length elsewhere and need not be 
reviewed here. 18 The point bearing emphasis is that the developments 
encountered substantial resistance, continue to do so, and are being 
eroded by the scale of contemporary outsourcing of government work to 
private entities. 
It took six years to enact the AP A after its forerunner the Walter-
Logan Act of 1940 was successfully vetoed by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Even in 1946, there was some opposition from the agencies 
including the view that congressional regulation of administrative 
11. W. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY (1989). 
12. See generally CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (1950); 
DAVID NACHMIAS & DAVID H .. ROSENBLOOM, BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT USA (1980); 
RALPH P. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE (4th ed. 1994); B. DAN WOOD & 
RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS (1994); WILLIAM GORMLEY, JR., & S. 
BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY (2004). 
13. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 1946 (1946). 
14. 79 CONG. REC. 92, 2150 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
15. This trade-off was deliberate. The Senate Judiciary Committee took " ... the 
position that the [AP A] bill must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some 
incidental or possible inconvenience to, or change in, present administrative operations." 79 
CONG. REC. 92, 2150 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran). 
16. Spady v. Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 419 U.S. 983, 985 (1974) (Dougals, J., 
dissenting). 
17. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 7, at 102. 
18. DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 1946-1999 (2000); 
ROSENBLOOM & O'LEARY, supra note 7, at 102. 
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procedures was a "retrograde step."19 Efforts to strengthen the APA's 
ineffective provisions for transparency, beginning in the mid-1950s, met 
with no success until the enactment of FOIA in 1966. President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson signed the act only after complaining that the "goddam 
bill will screw the Johnson administration!"20 Apparently every agency 
that testified on the bill was opposed to it.21 President Gerald Ford 
unsuccessfully vetoed the 197 4 FO IA amendments that substantially 
facilitated access to government records.22 In 2001, President George 
W. Bush issued an executive order23 that could drastically reduce access 
to information under the Presidential Records Act of 1978.24 The 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (1972)25 was an anathema to 
President Richard M. Nixon and his appointees. As the bill made its 
way through Congress, Nixon unsuccessfully tried to stifle its 
enactment by issuing an executive order regulating advisory 
committees. 26 The 1978 Government in the Sunshine Act has long been 
criticized for encumbering and weakening administrative decision-
making. 27 Defining an appropriate role for the President and the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) in AP A prescribed rulemaking has 
been a source of political contention since the 1970s. 28 
Likewise, the judicial effort to force constitutional rights and 
values into public administrative decision-making and other activity has 
been widely criticized for both its intended and unintended 
consequences. Opposition has been over both doctrine and 
implementation. For example, if any single case were emblematic of the 
"rights revolution" in public administration, it might be Goldberg v. 
19. Testimony of Clyde Aitchison, Comm'r of the Interstate Commerce Comm'n 
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1944-1946, at 97 ( 1946). 
20. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
180 (1982). 
21. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 18, at 50. 
22. Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (amending 4 
U.S.C. § 552 (1967)) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
23. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R 815 (2001), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.A. § 2204 
(2001). 
24. Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. § 2201-2207 (1978). 
25. Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). 
26. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT 19 
(Pub. L. No. 92-463) (1978). 
27. Randolph May, Recent Development: Reforming the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 415 (1997). 
28. CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING 121-26 (2nd ed. 1999); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 7 5-79 (2003 ). 
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Kelly (1970). 29 There, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court held that 
constitutional procedural due process entitles welfare recipients to a 
hearing prior to the termination of their benefits.30 Long forgotten, 
perhaps, is Justice Hugo Black's incredulousness at the Court's embrace 
of "new property" theory:31 
The Court. . . relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment and in effect 
says that the failure of the government to pay a promised charitable 
installment to an individual deprives that individual of his own 
property, in violation of the Due Process Clause. . . . It somewhat 
strains credulity to say that the government's promise of charity to an 
individual is property belonging to that individual when the 
government denies that the individual is honestly entitled to receive 
such a payment. 32 
The constitutionalization of public administration · has been especially 
criticized in the areas of public school desegregation,33 prison 
administration, 34 and public mental health care. 35 
II. REINVENTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The connection between reinventing government and de-inventing 
administrative law is not happenstance. The National Performance 
Review (NPR) considered administrative law and other procedural 
requirements to be impediments to effective administration, that is, to 
achieving "results": "Our path is clear: We must shift from systems that 
hold people accountable for process to systems that hold them 
accountable for results."36 Accordingly, the NPR called for dramatic 
internal deregulation of federal administration: "The President should 
29. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
30. Id. at 261. 
31. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964). 
32. Golberg, 397 U.S. at 275 (emphasis in the original). 
33. GERELD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE 38-172 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); DONALD L. HORROWITZ, THE COURTS AND 
SOCIAL POLICY 106-70 ( 1977). 
34. COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL 
INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John J. Diiulio, Jr. ed., 1990). 
35. JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); Note, The Wyatt Case: 
Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 
(1975); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, THE HOMELESS (1994). 
36. AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS 
BETTER & COSTS LESS 13 ( 1993 ). 
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issue a directive requiring all federal agencies to review internal 
government regulations over the next three years, with a goal of 
eliminating fifty percent of those regulations."37 To say the NPR 
disliked rules would be an understatement. It subscribed to the belief 
that, "The perverse effect of 'rule by rules' is that instead of reducing 
arbitrariness it appears to increase it; instead of fostering cooperation it 
destroys it; instead of solving problems it worsens them. "38 By 1999, 
the NPR claimed to have eliminated 16,000 pages from the Code of 
Federal Regulations and 640,000 pages of internal agency regulations.39 
The NPR called for legal reforms of the federal personnel systems, 
much reduced mandated reporting to Congress, reorientation of the 
inspectors general, as well as better rulemaking processes and decisions. 
However, it never tackled the APA or administrative law directly.40 
Neither did it necessarily respect the letter of the law when the APA 
might pose obstacles to reform. Perhaps the most outstanding (and 
embarrassing) example was the NPR's promotion of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration's Cooperative Compliance Program. 
The program offered firms relief from "wall-to-wall" inspections if they 
complied with a checklist of voluntary standards established by OSHA. 
The NPR gave the program's pilot version a much coveted Hammer 
Award and touted it as a model of commonsensical reform.41 The pilot 
seemed to work well in Maine, but when OSHA implemented it 
nationally firms complained that it was "more like coercion than 
cooperation" and amounted to "ambush rulemaking. "42 The Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the "voluntary" checklist 
amounted to an illegal circumvention of the AP A's requirements for 
rulemaking. 43 
As noted earlier, administrative law can also be legally 
circumvented by outsourcing government work. However, eluding 
37. Id. at 33. 
38. AL GORE, COMMON SENSE GOVERNMENT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 19 
(1995). 
39. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT FOR THE Bus. OF THE Gov'T, THE 
BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 7 (Ian Littman ed., 1999), available at http://www.businessof 
government.org?pdfs?BusottiovtFall99 .pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
40. See generally GORE, supra note 38, at 20-34; Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 
(1993). 
41. GORE, supra note 2, at 25-27. 
42. Christy Harris, Lack of Procedure Kills OSHA Reinvention Program, FEDERAL 
TIMES, April 26, 1999, at 3, 18 (quoting Jennifer Krese, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfr. Employment 
Policy Director). 
43. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety and 
Health Admin., 174 F.3d 206, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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administrative law requirements was not the prime reason-if a reason 
at all-that the NPR promoted outsourcing. Its main concerns were 
reducing the number of full time equivalent federal employees and 
saving money.44 It also noted that reinvention reforms did not require 
the nation to "jettison the traditional values that underlie democratic 
governance-values such as equal opportunity, justice, diversity, and 
democracy."45 That said, the NPR did not overtly place any value on 
public participation and transparency. It tended to triangulate the public 
into citizens, customers, and stakeholders. It paid less attention to 
citizens qua citizens because "When we are not trusted, when nothing 
we say or do seems to make a difference, we feel powerless. Elections 
alone do not restore that power. The power that matters in a self-
governing democracy is the power we can exercise 'over-the-counter,' 
on a daily basis, whenever we interact with our government, whenever 
we seek to make our needs known. "46 
The NPR' s primary focus on results, customer standards and 
satisfaction,47 and stakeholder involvement in decision-making48 tended 
to eclipse the values of administrative law. For example, a study of 
agency performance plans at the close of the Clinton administration 
revealed that seventeen of twenty-four major federal agencies 
completely ignored performance targets for handling FOIA requests. 
Four other agencies included such targets-proving they are relevant-
and an additional three referenced FOIA in some way.49 Being a non-
mission based concern for all the agencies except the National Archives 
and Records Administration (which did set a performance target), FOIA 
was not particularly salient to the NPR. 
Reinvention simply did not speak to FOIA and other democratizing 
provisions of administrative law. NPR proponents devoted little 
concerted thought and effort to determining how their prescriptions for 
management reforms might affect the administration of FO IA in 
practice. An empirical study found that FOIA implementation was in 
fact in "the path of reform,"50 though the NPR rarely mentioned it. In 
44. AL GORE, supra note 36, at i-iv. 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. AL GORE, supra note 38, at 93. 
47. BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTTING CUSTOMERS FIRST '95: STANDARDS FOR 
SERVING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ( 1995). 
48. See GORE, supra note 38, at 33-34. 
49. Suzanne J. Piotrowski & David H. Rosenbloom, Nonmission-Based Values in 
Results-Oriented Public Management: The Case of Freedom of Information, 62 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 643, 651-53 (2002). 
50. S. PIOTROWSKI, IN THE PATH OF REFORM: THE UNFORESEEN OUTCOMES OF PUBLIC 
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unplanned fashion, some NPR initiatives strengthened FOIA 
implementation, and thus governmental transparency, while others 
weakened it. The net effect of omitting FOIA from agency performance 
plans, as might be imagined, was to decrease organizational emphasis 
on FOIA functions. 
Conversely, the NPR initiatives of customer service and employee 
empowerment led, in some cases, to greater access to documents, thus 
strengthening governmental transparency. Customer service initiatives 
pre-dated the NPR, but the renewed emphasis did lead to some concrete 
changes in the way FOIA was implemented. FOIA offices became 
much more accessible. Many offices for the first time started to put 
phone numbers on their response letters to FOIA requesters so that 
individuals had someone to call when they had questions. 
The outsourcing of governmental functions and FOIA intersected 
in multiple ways. The use of contractors obfuscates transparency as it 
relates to the functions outsourced. However, in keeping with NPR 
initiatives, federal contractors are being used creatively within the 
document release process associated with FOIA implementation. 
Companies are hired by federal agencies to help process FO IA requests 
and identify documents. While this practice is controversial, it has 
shown some promise in reducing the number of unfilled FO IA requests 
the agencies have backlogged.51 In other words, reinvention is relevant 
to FOIA even though reinventers give little thought to it. The same is 
true of the relationship of reinvention to administrative law more 
generally, apparently without regard to who is in the White House. 
President Bush's program for reforming federal administration, the 
President's Management Agenda, 52 adheres to the main tenets of 
reinvention. 53 Before taking office, Bush emphasized that his "policies 
and . . . vision of government reform are guided by three principles: 
government should be citizen-centered, results-oriented, and wherever 
possible, market based."54 The President's Management Agenda, issued 
MANAGEMENT REFORM ON GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY (State University of New York 
Press) (forthcoming). 
51. The decision to withhold or release documents requested pursuant to FOIA is 
inherently governmental and cannot legally be outsourced. 
52. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA: 
FISCAL YEAR2002 (2001). 
53. The main difference is that the Bush administration emphasizes centralized 
direction of federal agencies by the President, his closest aides, and OMB. Concomitantly, 
the Bush administration does not embrace employee empowerment. See Alexis 
Simendinger, Results-Oriented President Uses Levers of Power, Jan. 25, 2002, 
http://www.goexec.com/dailyfed/0102/012502nj2.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
54. George W. Bush, Building a Responsive, Innovative Government, FEDERAL TIMES, 
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in August 2001, places strong emphasis on "competitive sourcing,"55 
which OMB treats as a focal point for implementation.56 In 2003, OMB 
concluded that of the 1,609 ,000 federal positions being tracked under 
the President's Management Agenda, 858,000 are potentially subject to 
outsourcing. 57 Like outsourcing under the NPR, competitive sourcing 
places limited, if any, importance on administrative law values. 
Ill. COMPETITIVE SOURCING: DECIDING WHAT AND WHEN TO 
OUTSOURCE 
Outsourcing within the framework of competitive sourcing 
requires three-stage decision-making. First, it must be determined 
whether the function involved is "inherently governmental." Inherently 
governmental functions cannot be legally outsourced. OMB's Circular 
A-76, the "rulebook" for competitive sourcing, defines inherently 
governmental as any 
activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by government personnel. These activities require the 
exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority 
and/or in making decisions for the government. Inherently 
governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise 
of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures 
and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or 
entitlements. 58 
Examples include policymaking, contracting, "[ d]etermining, 
protecting, and advancing" national interests through military or 
diplomatic action, judicial proceedings, contract management, matters 
"significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons," 
and acquiring, controlling, and disposing of U.S. property.59 Discretion 
is considered 
June 26, 2000, at 15 (reprinting excerpts of a June 9, 2000 address given by then Gov. 
George W. Bush in Philadelphia). 
55. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 52, at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
56. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY SCORECARDS (2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budintegration/scorecards/agency _scorecards.html (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
57. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: CONDUCTING PRIVATE-
PUBLIC COMPETITION IN A REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 3 (2003). 
58. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76, Attachment A, § 
B(l)(a) (2003). 
59. Id. 
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inherently governmental if it commits the government to a course of 
action when two or more alternative courses of action exist and the 
decision-making is not already limited or guided by existing policies, 
procedures, directions, orders, and other guidance that ( 1) identify 
specified ranges of acceptable decisions or conduct and (2) subject the 
discretionary authority to final approval or regular oversight by 
agency officials. 60 
Following these guidelines, there is nothing inherently governmental 
about launching space shuttles, building databases for military 
recruiters, and, probably, interrogating prisoners held in Abu Ghraib 
and in similar circumstances elsewhere. 
Second, the decision to competitively source requires a 
determination of whether a "commercial" function (i.e., one that is not 
inherently governmentally) should be retained by the government. 
Retention can be based on the impracticality of subjecting specific 
commercial functions to competitive sourcing exercises or the 
likelihood that outsourcing would not yield the best value in return for 
government spending.61 
Third, positions suitable for outsourcing are subjected to one of 
two types of competitive sourcing competitions. A standard competition 
is used when more than sixty-five positions are involved; a streamlined 
competition when there are sixty-five or fewer. Circular A-76 contains 
63 pages of detailed instructions on how to conduct these competitions 
and to reach decisions regarding the retention or outsourcing of 
functions. The chief decision criterion by far is cost-effectiveness. The 
competitive sourcing decision places no value whatsoever on 
transparency, stakeholder representation, public participation, and 
protection of employees' and others' constitutional rights that are 
legally guaranteed when functions are retained by the government-and 
very much likely to be lost when those functions are outsourced. In this 
sense, Circular A-7 6 ignores the development of administrative law, 
including relevant constitutional law, over the past six decades. 
60. Id. at B.l.b. 
61. Tichakom Hill, More Fighting Ahead Over Competitive Sourcing Goals, FEDERAL 
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, available at http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=577704 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2005). The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act requires agencies annually to 
list all their non-inherently governmental positions. Such positions are considered 
'commercial.' Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (Oct. 19, 1998). 
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IV. AN AP A FOR OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT WORK? 
At first blush, an AP A for outsourced government work may sound 
like an encumbering, self-defeating, unnecessary, and terribly bad idea. 
Such a statute would no doubt make private entities all the more 
disinclined to deal with government.62 Certainly, the vast majority of 
for-profits and many not-for-profits would be reluctant to subject their 
records to FOIA requests, hold open meetings, meet with advisory 
committees, and extend First Amendment-like whistleblower rights to 
their employees. 63 Anything that drives up the cost of outsourcing also 
detracts from its attractiveness as a strategy for accomplishing 
government objectives. Conversely, applying constitutional constraints 
to some outsourced functions, such as incarceration, may be a de facto 
prerequisite for privatization. Theory aside, the reality is that 
administrative law controls on outsourced functions are already 
evolving in several forums. Arguably, it might be better to appoint a 
committee of experts to analyze the issues comprehensively, much like 
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure did in 
the early 1940s with respect to the AP A. 64 
To date, the following are among the major applications of 
administrative law-like controls to outsourced functions. 
• State action doctrine. Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court 
has unequivocally placed privatized health care in prisons under the 
ambit of constitutional law.65 The Court also made it clear that "[i]t 
surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the 
most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply 
resorting to the corporate form. "66 According to the dissenters in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Association (2001 ), the Court took a major step toward applying 
constitutional constraints to private entities by creating a new category 
of state action, "entwinement."67 Depending on how it is defined, 
entwinement has the potential to cover a very wide variety of 
outsourced activities. 68 
62. Susan A. MacManus, Why Businesses are Reluctant to Sell to Governments, 51 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 328-44 (1991). 
63. Pickering v. Board ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
64. U.S. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADM. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT (U.S. Gov'T 
PRINTING OFFICE, 1941 ). 
65. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
66. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995). 
67. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 305 
(2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
68. Federal agencies have called on contractors to analyze proposed legislation; draft 
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• State Courts and Transparency. As of 2000, twenty-two states 
applied freedom of information or related transparency statutes to 
outsourced functions based on one or more of the following factors: 
performance "of a governmental function . . . level of government 
funding, ... extent of governmental involvement or regulation, and ... 
whether the entity was created by the government."69 
• The Federal Acquisition Regu.lation (FAR). FAR is a 
"codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for 
acquisitions by all [federal] executive agencies."70 It places the 
following two administrative law-like requirements on contractors 
performing outsourced governmental functions: 
1. Whistle blower protection. "Government contractors shall not 
discharge, demote or otherwise discriminate against an employee as a 
reprisal for disclosing information to a Member of Congress, or an 
authorized official of an agency or of the Department of Justice, 
relating to a substantial violation of law related to a contract 
(including the competition for or negotiation of a contract)."71 
2. Privacy Act notifications. "[I]f a contract specifically provides for 
the design, development, or operation of a system of records on 
individuals on behalf of an agency to accomplish an agency function, 
the agency must apply the requirements of the [Privacy] Act to the 
contractor and its employees working on the contract."72 This 
budget requirements, reports to Congress and preambles to rules; conduct public hearings; 
monitor arms control negotiations; participate on decisions regarding the export of nuclear 
technology; and provide services to an inspector general. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra 
note 10. 
69. Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's Right to Know: The Debate over 
Privatization and Access to Government Information under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 825, 836-53 (2000). 
70. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (2004), available at 
http://www.acqnet.gov/far/01-26/html/FARtoHTML.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
71. Id. § 3.903. 
72. Id.§ 24.102(c). See also id. §§ 52.224-1, 52.224-2. 
As prescribed in [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 24.104, insert the following clause in 
solicitations and contracts, when the design, development, or operation of a system of 
records on individuals is required to accomplish an agency function: 
Privacy Act Notification (Apr 1984) 
The Contractor will be required to design, develop, or operate a system of records on 
individuals, to accomplish an agency function subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, Public 
Law 93-579, December 31, 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and applicable agency regulations. 
Violation of the Act may involve the imposition of criminal penalties. 
(End of clause), and 52.224-2 
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provision clearly protects individuals against the disclosure of their 
personal information by contractors, other than for "routine use," 
defined as "for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for 
which it was collected."73 As a practical matter however, it may not 
prevent agencies from contracting private entities to collect 
information that the agencies could not legally collect on their own. 
Privacy Act: 
As prescribed in [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 24.104, insert the following clause in 
solicitations and contracts, when the design, development or operation of a system of 
records on individuals is required to accomplish agency function: 
Privacy Act (Apr 1984) 
(a) The Contractor agrees to-
(1) Comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) and the agency rules and 
regulations issued under the Act in the design, development, or operation of any 
system of records on individuals to accomplish an agency function when the contrast 
specifically identifies -
(i) The systems ofrecords; and 
(ii) The design, development, or operation work that the contractor is to perform; 
(2) Include the Privacy Act notification contained in this contract in every 
solicitation and resulting subcontract and in every subcontract awarded without a 
solicitation, when the work statement in the proposed subcontract requires the 
redesign, development, or operation of a system of records on individuals that is 
subject to the Act; and 
(3) Include this clause, including this paragraph (3), in all subcontracts awarded 
under this contract which requires the design, development, or operation of such a 
system of records. 
(b) In the event of violations of the Act, a civil action may be brought against the agency 
involved when the violation concerns the design, development, or operation of a system of 
records on individuals to accomplish an agency function, and criminal penalties may be 
imposed upon the officers or employees of the agency when the violation concerns the 
operation of a system of records on individuals to accomplish an agency function. For 
purposes of the Act, when the contract is for the operation of a system of records on 
individuals to accomplish an agency function, the Contractor is considered to be an 
employee of the agency. 
(c)(l) "Operation of a system ofrecords," as used in this clause, means performance of any 
of the activities associated with maintaining the system of records, including the collection, 
use, and dissemination of records. 
(2) "Record," as used in this clause, means any item, collection, or grouping of 
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not 
limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or 
employment history and that contains the person's name, or the identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a 
fingerprint or voiceprint or a photograph. 
(3) "System of records on individuals," as used in this clause, means a group of any 
records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the 
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual. 
(End of clause), 
available at http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/52_223 ~226.html (last visited Dec. 30, 
2005). 
73. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(l-12); (a)(7). 
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• Transparency. FOIA does not apply to the records of private 
entities. However, if the ownership of records is transferred to a 
government agency, such records are likely to be "agency records" 
subject to disclosure through FOIA. The Department of Energy 
Acquisition Regulation provides: 
Except [records on personnel, confidential financial matters, 
operations not related to (the Department of Energy), legal matters, 
and some aspects of technology, intellectual property, and 
procurement], . . . all records acquired or generated by the contractor 
in its performance of this contract shall be the property of the 
Government and shall be delivered to the Government or otherwise 
disposed of by the contractor either as the contracting officer may 
from time to time direct during the progress of the work or, in any 
event, as the contracting officer shall direct upon completion or 
termination of the contract. 74 
These are important steps to apply administrative law norms and 
constraints to the performance of outsourced government work. But 
they are limited in scope. Contemporary public administrative 
doctrine's emphasis on competitive sourcing and outsourcing clearly 
threatens the administrative law regime that, beginning in 1946, has 
done a great deal to make public bureaucracies in the United States 
more compatible with the nation's democratic-constitutional political 
institutions. 
CONCLUSION: AN "APA" FOR OUTSOURCED GOVERNMENT WORK? 
In 1987, an early advocate of outsourcing government functions, 
E.S. Savas, called privatization "the key to better government."75 A few 
years later, outsourcing became a core tenet of the reinventing 
government movement's promise to make governments "work better 
and cost less." In 2001, the President's Management Agenda promoted 
competitive sourcing to raise the level of sophistication in deciding 
whether to outsource. Reformers from Savas to former Vice President 
Al Gore to President George W. Bush have put much emphasis on 
74. Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation: Access to and Ownership of 
Records, 48 C.F.R. §9.970.5204-3 (2004) available at 
http:! /professionals. pr .doe.gov /ma5/MA-
5\Veb .nsf/b9a5371a6387d5bf85256a5d0058e259/f6ec030ffe98d7a905256b450045904c?Op 
enDocument (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
75. E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987). 
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"improving the way government does business. "76 
But do outsourcing and competitive sourcing improve the way 
government does government? This question can only be answered by 
entering the value of administrative law requirements into the equation 
when government considers outsourcing or competitive sourcing its 
functions. The federal and state courts as well as federal acquisition 
professionals are incrementally putting individual rights and 
transparency into such equations. However, the scope of outsourcing is 
now so vast that a more comprehensive and systematic approach may be 
warranted. Perhaps the time has come to join experts in administrative 
law with administrative reformers in an effort to determine whether the 
equivalent of an AP A for outsourced government functions is 
warranted, and if so, to draft a model statute for federal, state, and local 
government. 
76. GORE, supra note 38, at iv. 
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